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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the Order of the Fourth Judicial 
District Court for Utah County, the Honorable Boyd L. Park, 
granting the State's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to the 
"incarceration exception" of Section 63-30-10(1)(j) of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act (hereafter "UGIA"). This Court has 
jurisdiction over plaintiff's appeal pursuant to Section 
78-2-2(3)(i) of the Utah Code and Rule 4(a) of the Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Since this is appeal of an Order granting the State's 
Motion to Dismiss, the allegations of appellant's Verified 
Complaint are not disputed. Most of the facts set forth by 
appellant (hereafter "Kirk") in his Brief are immaterial to the 
legal issues before this Court on appeal. The undisputed 
material facts are as follows: 
1. At the time respondent State of Utah (hereafter 
"State") transported Ronnie Lee Gardner (hereafter "Gardner") 
to the Metropolitan Hall of Justice at Salt Lake City he "was 
. . . incarcerated at the Utah State Prison." Plaintiff's 
Verified Complaint at 1f 9, a copy of which is attached hereto 
as Appendix I. 
2. Gardner was in the company of two Utah State Prison 
guards during transport. See Brief of Appellant, Statement of 
Facts, at 11 3. 
3. After entering the Metropolitan Hall of Justice accom-
panied by the two armed guards, Gardner was passed a handgun by 
an accomplice, and thereafter shot Kirk. Plaintiff's Verified 
Complaint, supra, at 1f 7. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
By Kirk's own allegation, when the State transported 
Gardner from the prison to the courthouse he was "incarcer-
ated." Kirk also alleges that the State was negligent in the 
manner in which it transported Gardner. Thus, by Kirk's own 
allegations, his injury arose out of Gardner's incarceration 
and the UGIA expressly and unambiguously preserves the State's 
immunity from suit for injury which "arises out of the incar-
ceration of any person in any state prison . . . or other place 
of legal confinement." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(j) (1953, 
as amended). 
The State did not waive application of this immunity 
provision by purchasing insurance coverage. Immunity granted 
by the UGIA remains unless expressly waived, and no provision 




KIRK'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE 
INCARCERATION EXCEPTION OF THE UTAH 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
The UGIA codifies the common law principal that a govern-
mental entity is immune from suit except where it consents to 
be sued and establishes a three-step test for determining 
whether immunity exists: 
(1) The first step is to determine whether the activity 
out of which injury arises is "a governmental function." Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-3. If so, immunity exists. Kirk does not 
contend, nor can it reasonably be argued that the transport of 
Gardner from the prison to the courthouse is not a uniquely 
governmental function. See Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242, 244 
(Utah 1976) and Sheffield v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 445 P.2d 
367, 368 (1968). 
(2) Step two is to determine whether immunity is waived by 
the Act for the particular governmental function in question. 
While Kirk's Complaint makes no specific reference to a waiver 
of immunity provision, it is presumed that he relies on Section 
63-30-10(1), which waives immunity for "injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of his employment." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-10(1). 
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It will be presumed for the purposes of this portion of the 
argument only that the waiver of Section 63-30-10(1) applies. 
The State argues elsewhere, however, that there is no duty 
running from it to Kirk and, therefore, as a matter of law 
there can be no negligence. See "ARGUMENT," POINT III, infra. 
(3) The third step is to determine whether the waiver of 
immunity is subject to any exception. Section 63-30-10(1) 
lists several distinct exceptions to the general waiver of 
immunity for employee negligence. These exceptions are listed 
in the alternative rather than conjunctive, and thus only one 
need apply to void the waiver. The waiver and the exception 
applicable here are as follows: 
(1) Immunity from suit of all government entities is 
waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent 
act or omission of an employee committed within the 
scope of employment except if the injury: 
(j) arises out of the incarceration of any 
person in any state prison, county or city jail or 
other place of legal confinement. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(j). 
A. Kirk's Assailant Was Incarcerated At All Times 
Pertinent to this Action 
Plaintiff's Verified Complaint and the Statement of Facts 
in his Brief on appeal make it clear that Gardner was an inmate 
at the Utah State Prison, being held on a charge of first 
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degree murder for an incident which had occurred some months 
before. It is undisputed that at the time of the shooting in 
question, Gardner had been transported from the prison to the 
courthouse to be formally arraigned on the murder charge. 
Under the facts of this case it cannot reasonably be argued 
that Gardner was not still "incarcerated" when he reached the 
courthouse. 
In Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that an injury caused by an inmate who was 
"under the control of prison officials" was barred by the 
incarceration exception of Section 63-30-10(1)(j). The Court 
defined incarceration as being "in prison" or "under the 
control of the State." Id. at 93. Even Justice Maughan's 
dissent in Epting v. State, supra, upon which appellant relies 
in his Brief, states that the statutory provision in question 
would apply whether the inmate was "incarcerated . . . in the 
prison, or under the direct control of the state." 546 P.2d at 
246 (emphasis added). 
It is clear that Gardner, who was chained, handcuffed, and 
in leg irons, and who was accompanied by two uniformed prison 
guards carrying service revolvers, remained "under the control 
of the state." See, e.g., Emery v. State, 26 Utah 2d 1, 483 
P.2d 1296, 1297 (Utah 1971) (where the Court interpreted the 
words "other place of legal confinement" to include any place 
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"where one cannot be released without some kind of permission"). 
Indeed, Kirk's Verified Complaint acknowledges that Gardner was 
incarcerated "at the time" the prison guards transported him to 
the Metropolitan Hall of Justice. Gardner was still under the 
control of those guards when the escape ensued and was still 
"incarcerated" when the State's alleged negligence occurred. 
B. Kirk's Injury Arose Out of Gardner's Incarceration 
Kirk also argues that, even assuming Gardner's 
"incarceration," Kirk's injury did not "arise out of" the 
incarceration. The case authority cited by Kirk in his Brief, 
however, makes it clear that the term "arises out of" as found 
in Section 63-30-10(1)(j), is interpreted broadly, and 
encompass the facts of this case. 
In his Memorandum filed below in opposition to respondent's 
Motion to Dismiss, appellant quoted from Justice Maughan's opin-
ion in National Farmer's Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Western Cas. 
& Surety Co., 577 P.2d 961 (Utah 1978). The quote is helpful 
here: "The term 'arising out of' is ordinarily understood to 
mean originating from, incident to, or connected with the item 
in question." Id. at 963 (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme 
Court also applied this definition to the incarceration 
exception in Madsen v. State, supra. 
In Madsen, the wife and daughter of a Utah State Prison 
inmate who had died following surgery in the prison hospital 
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filed a wrongful death action against the prison and selected 
prison employees. The Court recognized that the inmate while 
not incarcerated in the prison, was confined to the hospital at 
the prison and concluded that the inmate's death "arose out of" 
incarceration and that "since this injury occurred while Madsen 
was under the control of prison officials, the governmental 
entities, vis., the State of Utah and the Board of Corrections, 
are both immune from liability." Ld. (emphasis added). Madsen 
reaffirms the Court's earlier rule announced in Emery v. State, 
supra, and Epting v. State, supra, that a prisoner's status and 
the state's control over the prisoner, rather than the pri-
soner's physical location, are the critical factors respecting 
application of the incarceration exception. 
In the present case, the inmate Ronnie Lee Gardner was 
chained and shackled, under the control of two uniformed prison 
guards armed with service revolvers, being transported to a 
District Court arraignment, when he tried to escape, injuring 
appellant in the process. In Epting v. State, supra, the 
assailant was an inmate on prison "work release," working a job 
outside the prison during the day. He walked away from the job 
and shortly thereafter murdered the claimants' mother. The 
inmate in Epting was not shackled or chained and was not accom-
panied by armed prison guards, but rather was on a privileged 
work release program outside the prison undertaking gainful 
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employment. Nevertheless, the Court in Epting concluded that 
there were just two logical alternatives for consideration 
under these circumstances: either (a) the prisoner had totally 
escaped the control of the prison and was thus acting on his 
own; or (b) the prisoner was under the control of the prison 
authorities so that his conduct arose out of his incarcera-
tion. Epting, 546 P.2d at 244. Under the first alternative, 
the prison could not be responsible for the prisoner's actions; 
under the second alternative, the prison would be immune from 
suit under the incarceration exception of the statute. Id. 
The same must hold true here. 
The rationale of Epting also is persuasive in reputing 
Kirk's argument that "there was no causal connection of the 
incarceration of Gardner and the shooting of the plaintiff." 
Brief of Appellant at 6-7. If there is no causal connection 
between the State's incarceration of Ronnie Lee Gardner and his 
shooting of Kirk there can be no causal connection between the 
State's alleged negligence and Kirk's injuries, and therefore 
appellant's claims must fail. 
Kirk cannot reasonably argue that no causal connection 
exists between the State's incarceration of Gardner and his 
injuries, while arguing that a causal connection does exist 
between the State's negligence and his injuries. Indeed, it is 
the State's failure to insure incarceration in fact upon which 
Kirk bases his negligence claim. 
-8-
But for Gardner's incarceration, there would have been no 
need for the State to transport him to the Metropolitan Hall of 
Justice. But for Gardner's incarceration there would have been 
no prison guards, no chains, no shackles. But for Gardner's 
incarceration, there would have been no attempt to escape. But 
for Gardner's incarceration, appellant would have no justifia-
ble reason to sue the State of Utah and its Department of 
Corrections. 
POINT II 
THE STATE OF UTAH DID NOT WAIVE IMMUNITY BY 
PURCHASING LIABILITY INSURANCE. 
A. Waivers of Immunity Must Be Expressly Stated in the 
UGIA. 
The UGIA is a codification of the common law principle of 
sovereign immunity. The Utah Supreme Court has stated suc-
cinctly that "the Act expressly provides for the continuance of 
sovereign immunity." Holt v, Utah State Road Comm'n, 30 Utah 
2d 4, 511 P.2d at 1287. Accordingly, the UGIA states that 
where a governmental entity is engaged in a "governmental 
function," the entity is immune from suit for any injury 
resulting therefrom, "except as may be otherwise provided in" 
the Act. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3. 
This language indicates legislative "intention that the act 
be strictly applied to preserve sovereign immunity; and to 
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waive it only as clearly expressed therein." Holt/ 511 P.2d at 
1288 (footnote omitted). Thus, a governmental entity is immune 
"unless immunity is expressly waived in one of the succeeding 
sections of the . . . Act." Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 
631 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added). 
Where a statute's meaning is plain from the words and 
language chosen by the Legislature, the courts must "assume 
that each term in the statute was used advisedly . . . and that 
each should be interpreted and applied according to its usually 
accepted meaning." West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 
(Utah 1982). This is precisely what the Utah Supreme Court has 
done in the past with respect to the "except as may be other-
wise provided" language of Section 63-30-3. Where no express 
waiver of immunity is found, no waiver can be implied. 
B. The UGIA Contains No Express Waiver of Immunity for 
Purchase of Insurance. 
Kirk's Brief does not cite any section of the UGIA where 
immunity is expressly waived by a governmental entity upon 
purchase of insurance. No such provision exists. Rather, he 
argues that the provision of the UGIA allowing a governmental 
entity to purchase insurance, to join with other entities to 
create a "reserve fund," or to create a fund of its own "to 
protect [it] from any or all risks created by this chapter," 
see Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-26 and 28, implies such a waiver. 
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However, the "risks created by this chapter" come only from the 
express waivers of immunity found in the Act. If immunity is 
not waived, there is no "risk" to be insured against. Thus, to 
argue that obtaining insurance expands or defines the risk 
simply does not follow. 
Moreover, public policy requires that governmental entities 
be entitled to rely on the unambiguous language of the UGIA in 
planning for potential liability risks. Were plaintiff's 
argument adopted here, governmental entities would lose all 
immunity simply by attempting to secure adequate protection 
from injuries arising out of activities for which immunity has 
expressly been waived. 
POINT III 
RESPONDENT OWED NO DUTY TO APPELLANT. 
By direct argument in his Memorandum opposing the Motion to 
Dismiss below, and by indirect argument in his Brief to this 
Court, appellant seeks to have Qbray v. Malmberg, 26 Utah 2d 
17, 484 P.2d 160 (1971), overruled. See Brief of Appellant at 
8-10; Memorandum in Opposition at 19. The Qbray decision 
adopts the "public duty" rule for Utah. That rule requires 
that plaintiff must show the breach of a duty owed to plaintiff 
as an individual, and not merely the breach of an obligation 
owed to the general public. See also 18 McQuillan, The Law of 
Municipal Corporations, § 53.046 at 165 (3rd Ed. 1971). 
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The rule also requires that plaintiff must show that he had 
a special relationship with defendants which would impose a 
duty greater than the general duty owed by the defendants to 
the public at large. See Humann v. Wilson, 696 F.2d 783, 784 
(10th Cir. 1983). Obray has not been overruled or modified by 
any Utah Supreme Court decision. To the contrary, the public 
duty rule of Obray was reaffirmed in 1984 by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Christenson v. Hayward, 694 P.2d 612 (Utah 1984). 
This general duty owed to the public at large may become a 
special duty owed to an individual, only where the governmental 
entity deals or acts directly with the injured party on an 
individual basis. See 18 McQuillan, supra, and cases cited 
therein. Such were the facts in Little v. Utah State Div. of 
Family Serv., 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983), cited by plaintiff in 
his Brief. There, the Division of Family Services placed a 
child in a foster home, assumed a specific duty to provide 
proper care for that child, and then breached that specific 
duty, causing injury to the child. 667 P.2d at 51-52. That is 
not the case here. No such direct contact took place between 
Kirk and the State; no special relationship was created; no 
specific duty towards appellant was assumed. 
Even where the state may assume voluntarily to perform 
certain acts or functions, either by statute, regulation, or 
otherwise, no liability or actionable duty is created absent a 
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special relationship with the claimant. See Davidson v. City 
of Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 649 P.2d 894, 899, 185 Cal. 
Rptr. 252 (1982) (the common theme running through cases in 
which a special relationship, and thus an actionable duty, has 
been found is the voluntary assumption by the public entity or 
official of a specific duty toward the injured party); Dinsky 
v. Town of Framingham, 386 Mass. 810, 438 N.E.2d 51, 56 (1982) 
(application of majority rule that in absence of special duty 
to plaintiff, different from duty owed to public at large, no 
cause of action can be maintained against a government 
entity). Thus, Obray is still good law in Utah. No duty 
exists and therefore appellant has no cause of action, 
precluding the necessity of applying Section 63-30-10(1)(j). 
With regard to appellant's argument that a duty "should" 
exist, this Court has not adopted Section 319 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, as appellant freely admits in 
his Brief. See Brief of Appellant at 9. This is not an appro-
priate case for this Court to consider doing so. Even if the 
Restatement section cited were adopted here and a duty created 
thereby upon which appellant could maintain an action, the 
specific immunity provision of Section 63-30-10(1)(j), which by 
its very language presumes that a duty exists, bars plaintiff's 
claim. Accordingly, this Court should not adopt Section 319 of 
the Restatement where its adoption would be precedent setting 
but have no legal effect. 
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POINT IV" 
KIRK'S "MODERN TREND" ARGUMENT SHOULD BE 
MADE TO THE LEGISLATURE, NOT THIS COURT. 
This Court has held consistently that the courts of this 
state are to give force and effect to statutory terms which are 
deemed to have been used advisedly by the Legislature. West 
Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d at 446. See also Gord v. Salt 
Lake City, 20 Utah 2d 138, 434 P.2d 449, 451 (1967). "It is 
not the duty of this Court to assess the wisdom of the 
statutory scheme," Gord, 434 P.2d at 451. Here, appellant 
argues that this Court should adopt a "modern trend" which is 
contrary to the clear statutory scheme set forth in the 
incarceration exception of Section 63-30-10(1)(j). See Brief 
of Appellant at 8-10. 
This Court must assume that the Legislature intended to 
accomplish just what the incarceration exception does—extend 
immunity to governmental entities in cases like the one at 
bar. This Court may not alter or skew application of clear 
statutory language simply because it disagrees with the wisdom, 
effectiveness, reasonableness or orderliness of the statute. 
See Gord, 434 P.2d at 451. The Court "has a duty to let [the 
statute] operate as the legislature has provided," id., 
regardless of "trends" in other states or jurisdictions. 
It should be noted that the "trend" states whose decisions 
appellant has cited in his Brief are jurisdictions which have 
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abrogated, abolished, altered, or never had a governmental 
immunity statutory framework similar to Utah's. The legal 
theories, doctrine or statutory bases for these decisions, 
then, are strikingly different than that before this Court 
here. See, for example, Spanel v. Mounds View Sch, Dist. No. 
621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962) and Tyler v. State, 
618 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Wyo. 1980). Decisions of courts from 
other jurisdictions which are based on statutes different from 
those of Utah, are not controlling law in Utah. See State v. 
Atherton, 69 Utah 53, 252 P. 280 (1926). 
Even the Utah cases cited by appellant in support of his 
"modern trend" argument are not applicable here. Neither Doe 
v. Arguelles, 716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1985) nor Little v. Utah State 
Div. of Fam. Serv., supra, deal with the incarceration excep-
tion of Section 63-30-10(1)(j) . Both dealt with the discre-
tionary function exception of Section 63-30-l0(1)(a) , which is 
not at issue here. Furthermore, neither discussed or adopted 
any "trend." 
Neither can Standiford v. Salt Lake City, 605 P.2d 1230 
(Utah 1980) be read to support a "trend" away from immunity for 
governmental functions. Standiford deals exclusively with the 
creation of a workable standard to determine whether a 




For the reasons set forth above, this Court should affirm 
the lower court's judgment of dismissal with prejudice and on 
the merits of appellant's Verified Complaint, and respondent 
State of Utah respectfully requests that this Court do so. 
DATED this //_ZT day of April, 1988. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
SCMCCF158 
Allan L*-' La£s 
Dennis C. FeTguson 
Christopher C. Fuller 
Attorneys for Respondent 
State of Utah 
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APPENDIX I 
PAUL N. COTRO-MANES, #736 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Suite 280, 311 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2377 
Telephone: 531-1300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE "NICK" KIRK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH and its 
subdivision, THE DEPARTMENT 
OF CORRECTIONS, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff complains and alleges: 
1. That he is a resident and citizen of the 
State of Utah and was at all times mentioned herein. 
2. That this action is brought pursuant to the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 63-30-1, et. seq., Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
3. That the plaintiff has properly and timely 
filed his notice of claim with the State of Utah as provided 
by 63-30-11, UCA, 1953 as amended, a copy of which is attached 
hereto, made a part hereof and marked as Exhibit "A," to 
which claim the defendants have failed, refused, and neglected 
to respond. 
V E R I F I E D 
C O M P L A I N T 
Civil No. 1 / "7 <' / > / 
Judge^w>-^c^ v w / \ ^/ \j - ^ r \ 
4. That the plaintiff has, with this complaint, 
filed an undertaking as required by 63-30-19, UCA, 1953 as 
amended, in the amount of $3 0 0.00. 
5. That the acts complained of herein occurred 
while the defendants1 officers, agents and employees were 
acting within the scope of their employment performing 
ministerial acts and functions in a negligent or grossly 
negligent manner evidencing a deliberate indifference to the 
rights of the plaintiff, said ministerial acts consisting of 
the transportation of one RONNIE LEE GARDNER to a court 
hearing in Salt Lake City, Utah, as is more fully set forth 
hereafter. 
6. That on or about the 2nd day of April 1985, 
the plaintiff, by and through its officers, agents and 
employees, acting within the scope of their employment and 
pursuant to the mandates and requirements of Utah law and 
Utah constitution, arranged for, planned and did transport 
one RONNIE LEE GARDNER from the Utah State Prison at Draper, 
Utah, to the Metropolitan Hall of Justice in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, so that the said RONNIE LEE GARDNER could attend a 
court hearing at which he was required to be in attendance. 
7. That due to the negligent or grossly negligent 
manner or manner exhibiting a deliberate indifference to the 
safety of the public, and in particular the plaintiff, and 
the manner by which the said RONNIE LEE GARDNER was restrained, 
transported, and guarded, the said RONNIE LEE GARDNER attempted 
to escape from the Metropolitan Hall of Justice at Salt Lake 
City, Utah, and in so doing, due to the negligent conduct of 
the defendants1 officers, agents and employees, acquired a 
deadly firearm and did shoot, among others, the plaintiff 
causing him temporary and permanent injuries, pain, suffering, 
permanent disfigurement, loss of work, income and other and 
further damages, both mental and physical. 
8, That the plaintiff incurred medical and doctor's 
expenses and charges in an amount as yet not fully ascertained 
and which are still being incurred for which the plaintiff 
is entitled to be reimbursed in such amount as may be proven 
at the time of trial. 
9. That at the time that the -plra-i-rrfci^f by and 
through its officers, agents and employees transported the 
said RONNIE LEE GARDNER to the Metropolitan Hall of Justice 
at Salt Lake City, Utah, the said RONNIE LEE GARDNER was 
facing a capital murder charge arising out of an incident 
which occurred during an earlier escape, and, further, was 
incarcerated at the Utah State Prison for various homicide, 
assault and other felony convictions, including escape. 
That the said RONNIE LEE GARDNER had made other successful 
escapes from the defendant and had made threats prior to the 
2nd day of April 1985, that he would again escape. That the 
officers, agents and employees of the defendant, knew, or 
should have known of the dangerous propensities of the said 
RONNIE LEE GARDNER but that they negligently, or grossly 
negligently, or with a deliberate indifference transported 
the said RONNIE LEE GARDNER and guarded him in such a manner 
that he attempted to escape from the Metropolitan Hall of 
Justice. 
10.. That the officers, agents and employees of 
the defendant did negligently or grossly negligently or with 
deliberate indifference train, instruct, counsel and direct 
other agents and employees in the methods and manner of 
restraint, transportation and guarding of persons being 
transported and that as a direct and proximate cause thereof 
the said RONNIE LEE GARDNER did attempt an escape as aforesaid. 
That the acts of the defendants were ministerial acts and as 
such are not subject to any claim of sovereign immunity. 
11. That as a direct and proximate cause of the 
conduct of the defendants, acting through their officers, 
agents and employees the plaintiff suffered the injuries and 
losses set forth above. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment as follows: 
(1) That the Court award to the plaintiff herein, 
special damages in the sum of $25,000 or such other and 
further sum as may be proven at the time of trial in this 
matter; 
(2) That the Court award to the plaintiff herein, 
general damages in the sum of $400,000 or such other and 
further sum as may be proven at the time of trial in this 
matter; 
(3) For such other and further relief as the 
Court deems just in the premises, pre-judgment interest at 
the legal rate set by the laws of the State of Utah, costs 
and interest after judgment. 
George /Nick" Kirk 
Plaintiff's address: 
5111 South 4460 West 
Kearns, Utah 84118 
^'PAUL N. COTRO-MANES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Suite 280, 311 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2377 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
GEORGE "NICK" KIRK, being first duly sworn, deposes 
and says that he is the plaintiff in the foregoing action, 
that he has read the foregoing complaint and knows and 
understands the contents thereof; that the same is true 
of his own knowledge, except as to matters therein stated 
on information and belief, and as to such matters he believes 
them to be true. 
—' "7 vT- ^ 
M 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /£ day of 
January 1987. 
Notary Public, residing at 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
CLAIM AGAINST THE STATE OF UTAH 
and its 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS * 
its Warden, Officers 
and Employees 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
GEORGE "NICK" KIRK being duly sworn deposes and 
says: 
1. That he is a resident and citizen of the State 
of Utah and that he is over the age of 21 years and that this 
.Claim is filed pursuant to 63-30-1, et. seq. , Utah Code Anno,, 
1953 as amended. 
2. That on the 2nd day of April 1985, your affiant 
was employed by the Sheriff of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, as a bailiff assigned to the Third Judicial District 
Court, County of Salt Lake, New Courts Building, Metropolitan 
Hall of Justice, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
3. That on the 2nd day of April 19 85, pursuant to 
the provisions of the Utah Constitution and the statutory 
laws of the State of Utah, requiring the attendance of an 
accused at court hearings involving him, the State of Utah 
by and through its Department of Corrections, its officers, 
agents, and employees, transported one RONNIE LEE GARDNER to 
the Metropolitan Hall of Justice, New Courts Building, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, for a court hearing arising out of certain 
alleged criminal conduct of the said Ronnie Lee Gardner. 
4. That in so doing, the State of Utah by and 
through its officers, agents, and employees were acting in a 
ministerial capacity and subject to the provisions of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act waiving immunity in such 
situations. 
5. That the State of Utah by and through its 
Department of Corrections, the Warden of the Utah State 
Prison and his officers, agents, and employees, all employed 
by the State of Utah, while they were then and there acting 
in their official capacity and within the scope of their 
authority and employment, negligently or willfully transported 
the said Ronnie Lee Gardner in such a manner and/or under 
such negligently or willfully applied restraints and/or the 
omission to apply the same and/or with such negligent disregard 
of watchfulness and caution normally associated with the 
movement of such a person, that the said Ronnie Lee Gardner 
obtained possession of a loaded firearm and did attempt to 
escape from the Metropolitan Hall of Justice and in so doing 
did grievously shoot and injure your affiant, George "Nick11 
Kirk, without provocation, who, as a direct and proximate 
cause of the negligent acts and omissions of the State of 
Utah, its officers, agents, and employees, suffered permanent 
disabling injury to his body, undergone pain, suffering, 
surgery, loss of employment, incurred medical and hospital 
expenses and has otherwise suffered with a resulting economic 
loss of $ 25,000.00 for medical and hospital bills and 
general damages in the sum of $ 400,000.00' so far as they 
are known at this time. 
6. That at the time that the State of Utah by and 
through its officers, agents, and employees transported the 
said Ronnie Lee Gardner into the Metropolitan Hall of Justice, 
New Courts Building, it and they well knew that the said 
Ronnie Lee Gardner had on a previous occasion, a short time 
prior to the 2nd day of April 1985, escaped from the custody 
of the State of Utah, its Department of Corrections and the 
officers, agents, and employees thereof; and further had 
allegedly murdered a citizen of the State of Utah while on 
escape; further, the said Ronnie Lee Gardner had announced 
to the officers, agents, and employees of the State of Utah, 
previous to April 2, 1985, his intent to attempt future 
escapes. Even though the said State of Utah by and through 
its officers, agents, and employees knew of the dangerous 
propensities of the said Ronnie Lee Gardner, it and they 
took no precautionary measures, all ministerial in nature, 
to protect the public and in particular your affiant, George 
"Nick" Kirk, from the said Ronnie Lee Gardner. 
7. That this affidavit and claim are filed pursuant 
to 63-30-11, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, and is 
timely under the provisions of 63-30-12, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 as amended. 
8. All communications relative to this notice of 
claim should be served upon my attorney, Paul N. Cotro-
Manes, Esq., Attorney at Law, Suite 280, 311 South State 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2377, telephone (801) 
531-1300. 
-^ /~£ZtS7>rW SsAz&C /Mjnr-*& 
GETORGE ^ NICK'LKIRK 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this \^0r£i day 
of January 1986. 
My Commiss ion E x p i r e s : 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES AUG. 21,1988 
Notary Public, residing^: 
fait Lake County, Utah 
5AUL N. COTRO-MANES 
Attorney for Affiant 
George "Nick" Kirk 
Suite 280, 311 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2377 
APPENDIX I I 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
********* 
GEORGE "Nick" KIRK, 
: Civil No. CV-87873 
Plaintiff, 
-vs- RULING 
STATE OF UTAH, et al. : BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE 
Defendants. 
********* 
This matter came regularly before the court for hearing on 
Thursday, August 13, 1987, on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
based upon sovereign immunity pursuant to 63-30-1 et seq. 
Paul N. Cotro-Manes esq. represented Plaintiff. Christopher 
C. Fuller esq. represented Defendants. The Court, having 
heard oral arguments of counsel in the premises, having read 
the Motion to Dismiss, the Memoranda in Support of the Motion, 
and the Memoranda in Opposition to the Motion, makes the 
following Findings and Ruling: 
FINDINGS 
1. On April 2, 1985, during an escape attempt at the Salt 
Lake Metropolitan Hall of Justice, prison inmate Ronnie 
Lee Gardner shot bailiff George "Nick" Kirk, plaintiff 
herein, in the stomach. 
On January 12f 1987, Plaintiff filed this negligence action 
against the State of Utah and the Utah State Department of 
Corrections. 
On February 9, 1987, defendants filed a motion to dismiss 
this action based on the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
63-30-1 et seq. 
Section 63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
which expressly provides for the continuance of sovereign 
immunity for any injury resulting from the exercise of a 
governmental function "except as otherwise provided in this 
chapter," indicates an intention that the act be strictly 
applied to preserve sovereign immunity. Holt v. Utah State 
Road Commission, 30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1973). 
Section 63-30-2(4) of the Utah Sovereign Immunity Act 
defines "Governmental function" as: 
any act or failure to act, operation, function, or under-
taking of a governmental entity whether or not the act 
or failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking 
is characterized as a governmental, proprietary, a core 
governmental function, unique to government, undertaken 
in a dual capacity, essential or not essential to a 
government or government function, or could be performed 
by private enterprise. 
By delivering inmate Ronnie Lee Gardner to the court, the 
defendant's employees were clearly engaged in a governmental 
function within the meaning of 63-30-2(4) and the fact that 
that such activity could be performed by private enterprise 
does not alter that result. 
7. Section 63-30-10(1) expressly waives governmental immunity 
from suit for injury proximately caused by a negligent act 
or omission of an employee committed within the scope of his 
authority except for certain enumerated exceptions. 
8. One exception expressly retains governmental immunity if the 
injury "arises out of the incarceration of any person in any 
state prison . . ." Section 63-30-10(1)(j) U.C.A 1953, as 
amended; previously numbered as 63-30-10(10). 
9. The plain meaning of that section reflects a legislative 
intent to retain sovereign immunity for any injuries 
occurring while the incarcerated person is in prison 
and under the control of the state. Madsen v. State, 
583 P.2d 92f 93 (Utah 1978). 
10. The fact that inmate Ronnie Lee Gardner was brought to 
the Salt Lake Metropolitan Hall of Justice for court 
proceedings does not change the fact that Gardner was 
an inmate incarcerated at the Utah State Prison who 
was under the control of the state. 
11. The governmental entity is immune "unless immunity is 
expressly waived in one of the succeeding sections of 
the . . . Act," Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 
631 (Utah 1983)(emphasis added), and a waiver of that 
immunity cannot be implied solely by the fact a state 
has chosen to purchase insurance coverage. 
12. This court recognizes that sovereign immunity is a harsh 
doctrine which effectively deprives the plaintiff of his 
remedy for actual injuries suffered. The court further 
acknowledges that, while several states are currently 
restricting sovereign immunity, the State of Utah seems 
to be reinforcing sovereign imminity. However, this 
court is not the appropriate forum to change the policy 
of the Utah State Legislature nor the rulings of the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
RULING 
1. Defendant's are immune from this suit pursuant to Section 
63-30-10(1)(j) of the Utah State Governmental Immunity Act, 
2. Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss this action is granted. 
Dated this 4th day of November, 1987. 
BY THE COURT 
BOYD L. PARK,^DISTRICT JUDGE 
c c : Paul N. Cotro-Manes esq . 
Chr i s tophe r C. F u l l e r esq . 
Brent A. Burnett, esq. 
ALLAN L. LARSON 
JODY K BURNETT 
CHRISTOPHER C. FULLER 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Co-Counsel for Defendants 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE "NICK" KIRK, 
Plaintiff, ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
vs. 
Civil No. CV-87873 
THE STATE OF UTAH and its (Formerly Third District 
subdivision, THE DEPARTMENT Court Civil No. C-87-00198) 
OF CORRECTIONS, 
Defendants. 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, based upon sovereign immunity 
pursuant to Section 63-30-1, ejt seq. , Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
as amended, came on for oral argument before the above-referenced 
Court on Thursday, August 13, 1987, with Paul N. Cotro-Manes 
representing plaintiff, and Christopher C. Fuller of Snow, Christen-
sen & Martineau representing defendants. The Court, having heard 
oral arguments of counsel, having read the Motion to Dismiss, the 
memoranda in support of the Motion, and the memoranda in opposition 
to the Motion, the Court having issued a Ruling on the Motion on 
November 4, 1987, being fully advised in the premises, the Court 
finds and concludes as follows: 
1. On April 2, 1985, during an escape attempt at the Salt 
Lake Metropolitan Hall of Justice, prison inmate Ronnie Lee 
Gardner shot bailiff George "Nick" Kirk, plaintiff herein, in 
the stomach• 
2. On January 12, 1987, plaintiff filed this negligence 
action against the State of Utah and the Utah State Department of 
Corrections. 
3. On February 9, 1987, defendants filed a motion to dismiss 
this action based on the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 63-30-1, 
et seg. 
4. Section 63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
which expressly provides for the continuance of sovereign immunity 
for any injury resulting from the exercise of a governmental func-
tion "except as otherwise provided in this chapter," indicates an 
intention that the act be strictly applied to preserve sovereign 
immunity. Holt v. Utah State Road Commission, 30 Utah 2d 4, 511 
P.2d 1286 (Utah 1973). 
5. Section 63-30-2(4) of the Utah Sovereign Immunity Act 
defines "Governmental function" as: 
any act or failure to act, operation, function, or under-
taking of a governmental entity whether or not the act 
or failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking 
is characterized as a governmental, proprietary, a core 
governmental function, unique to government, undertaken 
in a dual capacity, essential or not essential to a 
government or government function, or could be performed 
by private enterprise. 
6. By delivering inmate Ronnie Lee Gardner to the court, the 
defendant's employees were clearly engaged in a governmental func-
tion within the meaning of 63-30-2(4) and the fact that such activity 
- 9 -
could be performed by private enterprise does not alter that re-
sult. 
7. Section 63-30-10(1) expressly waives governmental immunity 
from suit or injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omis-
sion of an employee committed within the scope of his authority 
except for certain enumerated exceptions. 
8. One exception expressly retains governmental immunity if 
the injury "arises out of the incarceration of any person in any 
state prison . . ." Section 63-30-10(1)(j) U.C.A. 1953, as amended; 
previously numbered as 63-30-10(10). 
9. The plain meaning of that section reflects a legislative 
intent to retain sovereign immunity for any injuries occurring 
while the incarcerated person is in prison and under the control 
of the state. Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1978). 
10. The fact that inmate Ronnie Lee Gardner was brought to 
the Salt Lake Metropolitan Hall of Justice for court proceedings 
does not change the fact that Gardner was an inmate incarcerated 
at the Utah State Prison who was under the control of the state. 
11. The governmental entity is immune "unless immunity is 
expressly waived in one of the succeeding sections of the . . . 
Act," Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 631 (Utah 1983) (emphasis 
added), and a waiver of that immunity cannot be implied solely 
by the fact a state has chosen to purchase insurance coverage. 
12. This court recognizes that sovereign immunity is a harsh 
doctrine which effectively deprives the plaintiff of his remedy 
for actual injuries suffered. The court further acknowledges that, 
while several states are currently restricting sovereign immunity, 
the State of Utah seems to be reinforcing sovereign immunity. 
However, this court is not the appropriate forum to change the 
policy of the Utah State Legislature nor the rulings of the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
WHEREFORE, based upon the above-listed findings, the Court 
concludes and rules that defendants are immune from this suit pur-
suant to Section 63-30-10 (1) (j) of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act, and accordingly, defendants1 Motion to Dismiss should be 
granted. 
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that, based 
upon the above-listed findings and conclusions, defendants are 
immune from suit in this action and plaintiff's Complaint is 
barred pursuant to Section 63-30-10 (1) (j) of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act, and plaintiff's Complaint should be, and hereby is, 
dismissed with prejudice and on the merits, no cause of action. 
Each party to bear its own costs herein. 
DATED this day of November, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
Boyd L. Park, Fourth Judicial 
District Court Judge 
- 4 -
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
MARIE B. VAN WENSVEEN, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the law offices of Snow, Christen-
sen & Martineau, attorneys for Defendants 
herein; that she served the attached Order and Judgment 
(Case Number CV-87873 , Utah County) 
upon the parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy 
thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Paul N. Cotro-Manes 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Suite 280, 311 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
on the /fijfck day of November , 1987. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /Ctir day of 
November , 19B7. 
3> 
Notary Public 
P^^-irHnc in the State of Utah 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing Brief of 
Respondent by mailing four copies to Paul N. Cotro-Manes, Esq., 
Attorney for Appellant, at 311 South State Street, Suite 280, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 11th day of April, 1988. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Christopher (SL. Duller 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
